Rationality – Racionalnost

X[th] Bled Philosophical Conference

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Bled, Hotel Kompas

Slovenian Society for Analytic Philosophy and Philosophy of Science

Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti

Ljubljana 2002

PROGRAM

Monday, June 3rd

10:00   The organizers: *Welcome*

10:15-11:15 Nenad Miščević ▪ University of Maribor
                 Conceptual Change: The Rationality of Intuition-Kinematics

11:30-12:30 Noa Latham ▪ Reed College
                 The Causal Theory of Acting for a Reason

2:30-3:30   Paul Weirich ▪ University of Missouri
                 Rationality for Errant Agents

3:45-4:45   Susan Vineberg ▪ Wayne State University
                 Defending Probabilism as a Norm of Epistemic Rationality

5:00-6:00   Peter van Inwagen ▪ University of Notre Dame
                 *Is It Rational to Believe that the World Will End Soon? An Exercise
                 in Bayesian Reasoning*

Tuesday, June 4th

9:00-10:00   Anthony Dardis ▪ Hofstra University
                 Magnetotactic Bacteria and the Wason Selection Test

10:15-11:15 Bruce Russell ▪ Wayne State University
                 Morality, Reason, and Rationality

11:30-12:30 Matjaž Potrč ▪ University of Ljubljana
                 Particularism and Productivity Argument

2:30-3:30   Dan Farrell ▪ Ohio State University
                 Rationality and the Emotions

3:45-4:45   Tal Brewer ▪ University of Virginia
                 Savoring Time: Desire, Pleasure and Wholehearted Activity

5:00-6:00   Miroslava Andjelković ▪ University of Belgrade
                 Rationality and Knowing How

Wednesday, June 5ᵗʰ

9:00-10:00   Nenad Smokrović ▪ University of Rijeka
Normativity of Reasoning and Naturalism

10:15-11:15 Matthias Steup ▪ St. Cloud State College
Reliability Knowledge and the Reliability of Our Faculties

11:30-12:30 Dale Jacquette ▪ Pennsylvania State University
Rationality and the Preface Paradox

2:30-3:30   Kirk Ludwig ▪ University of Florida
Rationality and Non-inferential Knowledge of What We Think

3:45-4:45   Carolyn Price ▪ Open University
Learning and Rationality

5:00-6:00   Mylan Engel, Jr. ▪ Northern Illinois University
*Plantinga meets Reid on Proper Basicality: A Defense of
Evidentialism*

Thursday, June 6ᵗʰ

STUDENT SESSIONS (10.00)

- Vojko Strahovnik, University of Ljubljana, *In Defence of Moral
  Particularism: Is it Rational to Trust Patty?*
- Teja Oblak, University of Ljubljana, *Berkeley: Immaterialism does not
  imply non-matter*
- Marijo Biluš, University of Ljubljana, *Power of Principles?*
- Ana Gavran, University of Rijeka, *Crane on narrow content*
- Ksenija Puškarić, University of Rijeka, *Rosenthal on HOT theory of
  consciousness*
- Filip Čeč, University of Rijeka, *Evolutionary rationality: Papineau's
  proposal*
- Ana Butković, University of Rijeka, *Rationality*

Graduate students
- Matija Arko, University of Maribor, *Frege on Existence*
- Gorazd Andrejč, University of Maribor, *Epistemology of Religious Belief*
- Maja Malec, University of Ljubljana, *David Lewis and Modal Realism*
- Smiljana Gartner, University of Maribor, *Schiffer against Contextualism*

Friday, June 7th

10:15-11:15 Olga Markič ▪ University of Ljubljana
Computationalism and Rationality

11:30-12:30 Dion Scott-Kakures ▪ Scripps College
Reasoning and Self-Knowledge in Self-Deception

2:30-3:30 Marina Sbisa ▪ University of Trieste
Argumentative Rationality and Text Comprehension

3:45-4:45 Boran Berčić ▪ University of Rijeka
Reasons for Acting and Reasons for Living

5:00-6:00 Don Hubin ▪ Ohio State University
Desires, Whims and Values

Saturday, June 8th

11:30-12:30 Eugene Mills ▪ Virginia Commonwealth University
Rational, Unjustified Belief

10:15-11:15 Philip Percival ▪ University of Glasgow
Epistemic Consequentialism

11:15 Closing ceremony

Abstracts

Boran Berčić
University of Rijeka, Croatia

Reasons for Acting and Reasons for Living (Instrumental Rationality and the Meaning of Life)

How to answer the question What is the meaning of life? Is there any firm ground that we can start from? I shall try to show that the logical structure of our reasons for acting is a ground that is firm enough to start from. Moreover, I shall try to show that this ground naturally forces us to search the ultimate reason(s) for living. That is, that instrumental rationality forces us to search the meaning of life. The idea is based on two plausible assumptions, perhaps principles of practical rationality: (1) It is irrational to act without a reason; (2) If $Rn+1$ is a reason for Rn, and if there is no reason for $Rn+1$, then there is no reason for Rn. However, the problem is that these two principles actually lead to the Agrippian problems in the domain of practical rationality. Once we accept these axioms, it is not clear how we could block the Why?Why?Why? regress? Why are you doing A? Because I want to achieve B! Why do you want to achieve B? Because I want to achieve C! Why do you ... And so on. We can not simply refuse to answer on these lines because, according to A2, if there is no reason for trying to achieve C, then there is no reason to do A. And this holds for everything that we do. So, if we have no reason to live, we have no reason to do anything. Therefore, in order to have a reason to do anything, we must have a reason to live. At this point the skeptic could argue that: (1) any point at which we try to block the regress is arbitrary, that is, that self-justifying answer simply does not exist; that (2) we are not allowed to justify in circle because circular justification is no good; and that (3), since we can not justify our actions ad infinitum, we have to admit that they are not justified at all, that is, that we have no reason to do anything. In principle there are three possible reactions to this argument:

1) Admit that there is no ultimate answer, and that consequently we have no reason to do anything.
2) Try to find the ultimate answer that justifies itself and everything else that we do.
3) Try to reject or to modify the framework of instrumental rationality as inappropriate for the discussion about the meaning of life.

I shall try to show that reactions 1) and 2) are wrong because they are based on the foundationalist picture of the structure of our reasons for acting. Instead, I shall propose a pragmatist-coherentist picture of the structure of our reasons for acting, and try to show that this picture provides a better framework for answering the question about the meaning of life. The idea of hierarchy of reasons should be replaced with the idea of "web of reasons". PPR1 and PPR2 should be modified. Within pragmatist-coherentist framework there are stronger and weaker reasons, but there are no fundamental reasons. Consequently, within this framework, there can not be such a thing as THE meaning of life. So, if we accept pragmatist-coherentist picture of the practical reason (as descriptively more appropriate and normatively more convenient), we should reject the search for THE meaning of life as based upon a wrong (foundationalist) picture of the logical structure of our reasons for acting.

Talbot M. Brewer
University of Virginia, USA

Savoring Time: Desire, Pleasure and Wholehearted Activity

There is considerable appeal to the Aristotelian idea that taking pleasure in an activity is sometimes simply a matter of attending to it in such a way as to render it unimpeded or wholehearted. However, the proponents of this idea have not made adequately clear what kind of attention it is that can perform the surprising feat of transforming otherwise indifferent activities into pleasurable ones. I address this matter by building upon Gilbert Ryle's suggestion that taking pleasure in an activity is tantamount to engaging in the activity while fervently desiring to do it and it alone. More specifically, I draw upon insights into the sort of evaluative attention involved in having a desire to generate corollary insights into the sort of attention that makes activity pleasurable. My aim is not merely to offer a compelling account of a certain kind of pleasures, but also to shed light on their relation to reasons and values. I argue that pleasures of this kind are not always reasons to perform the activities that give rise to them, and that even when they are such reasons they have this status only derivatively, as vivid apprehensions of an independent realm of values. The goodness and reason-giving force of these pleasures turns out to depend, paradoxically, on the falsity of the hedonist thesis that all and only pleasures are valuable. This does not mean that pleasures of this kind are never good. They are good in one sense (they redound to one's moral credit) when they manifest a keen moral sensitivity or wholehearted moral concern. They are good in another sense (they enhance one's well-being) when they track real values, for then they constitute a proper savoring of one's activities and/or circumstances, and provide a valuable respite from the distractions and unwarranted doubts that so often leave us at odds with ourselves and alienated from our own doings.

Anthony Dardis
Hofstra University, USA

Magnetotactic Bacteria and the Wason Selection Test

Empirical tests appear to have bleak consequences for human rationality: people reliably reason badly. Quine and Davidson along with many cognitive scientists argue that it is something like a conceptual truth that people are rational. This paper presents independent confirmation of the Quine/Davidson ``Principle of Charity'' strategy. Naturalistic theories of content attempt to give a metaphysical account of the nature of content. Any successful theory of this sort requires that if a contentful state occurs in a large network of contentful states, then the network must be linked by the principles of normative rationality. Hence reflection on magnetotactic bacteria shows us what to say about the Wason Selection Test. If a person understands the test she is taking, then she must have a rational structure of contentful states. Hence despite her poor performance her underlying competence must be normatively correct.

Mylan Engel, Jr.
Northern Illinois University, USA

Plantinga meets Reid on proper basicality: a defense of evidentialism

Evidentialism* in the philosophy of religion is the view that belief in God is irrational in the absence of adequate evidence of its truth. The evidentialist objection to theistic belief is predicated on this view (EO):

(1) It is irrational to believe that God exists in the absence of adequate evidence of God's existence.
(2) There is no adequate evidence of God's existence.
(3) Therefore, it is irrational to believe that God exists.

Since (EO) is valid, the rational theist, if she wishes to remain both, must reject one of its premises. Plantinga rejects premise (1), the thesis of evidentialism. He argues (a) that evidentialism is rooted in classical foundationalism, (b) that classical foundationalism is both false and self-referentially incoherent, and (c) that therefore evidentialism lacks an appropriate rationale. He then argues that, given the collapse of classical foundationalism and evidentialism, the theist is within her rights in taking theistic belief to be properly basic, i.e. rationally acceptable without evidence of its truth.

My paper defends a qualified version of evidentialism, namely, that it is irrational for mature competent cognizers to believe in God in the absence of adequate evidence of God's existence. Using Plantinga's own inductive method for assessing criteria of proper basicality, I demonstrate that Plantinga has failed to show that theistic belief can be properly basic. If Plantinga wishes to show that belief in God can be properly basic, he must provide a criterion of proper basicality that [1] is free from self-referential difficulties, [2] admits belief in God as properly basic but rules out Great Pumpkinistic belief as properly basic, and [3] is such that there is some reason to think it true. He has not done so. Up to this point, neither Plantinga nor the evidentialist has demonstrated their respective positions. I end this unsatisfactory stalemate by providing a defense of evidentialism by using Reid's work on proper basicality to articulate a nonclassical version of foundational, which [1] is free of self-referential difficulties, [2] rules out belief in God as properly basic for mature competent cognizers, and [3] is such that Plantinga's inductive method gives us a reason to think that it is true. The conclusion is that Reidian nonclassical foundationalism vindicates evidentialism and is immune to Plantinga's criticisms. As a result, if the rational theist wishes to remain both, she must find adequate evidence for her belief in God, for absent such evidence, she is not within her epistemic rights in believing that God exists.

*The term 'evidentialism' is also used to refer to a general epistemological theory according to which we are epistemically obligated to proportion our belief to the evidence. However, in the present paper, the term 'evidentialism' is used more narrowly to refer to evidentialism in the philosophy of religion -- the thesis that belief in God is irrational in the absence of adequate evidence of its truth (where God =df the one and only supreme being who is omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient, creator of the universe, self-existent, eternal, perfectly wise and just, and possesses personhood.). I use the locutions 'belief in God', 'belief that God exists', and 'theistic belief' interchangeably to refer to the existential belief that God (as just defined) exists. The kind of evidence required by the evidentialist is evidence the theist can appeal to in justifying her belief in God to herself or others. As such,

the evidence must be propositional and not merely experiential. Moreover, the evidence must provide an epistemic reason for the belief that God exists (where an epistemic reason for p is a reason to think that p is true), not a pragmatic, prudential, or moral reason.

Dan Farrell
Ohio State University, USA

Rationality and the Emotions

Recent work on the emotions, and on the place of the notion of rationality in emotion-contexts, reveals deep and wide-ranging disagreements about the role (if any) the concept of rationality can or should play in theorizing and just plain talking about the emotions. I argue that there are certain respects in which it is uncontroversial that emotional states can be rational or irrational, explaining what I take these respects to be, and I argue that there are other respects in which it is extremely difficult to see how talk of rationality can be made sense of in emotion-contexts.

Don Hubin
Ohio State University, USA

Desires, Whims and Values

Neo-Humean instrumentalists hold that an agent's reasons for acting are grounded in the agent's subjective, contingent, conative states. If the view is interpreted so that all such states generate reasons for acting, it encounters problems with certain sorts of desires such as "alien desires"--desires with which the agent does not identify. The standard version of neo-Humeanism holds that these desires, like any others generate reasons for acting. This is an undesirable implication of the theory. A variant of neo-Humeanism that grounds an agent's reasons on her values, rather than all of her desires, avoids this implication, but at the cost of denying that we have reasons to act on innocent whims and other desires that are not grounded in values or otherwise endorsed by a value. A version of neo-Humeanism that holds that an agent has reason to satisfy all of her desires that are not in conflict with her values appears to allow us to grant the reason-giving force of innocent whims while denying the reason-giving force of alien desires. This sort of "value-screened neo-Humeanism" is, then, initially attractive and merits further exploration and development.

Dale Jacquette
The Pennsylvania State University, USA

Rationality and the Preface Paradox

The preface paradox is the apparent pragmatic inconsistency that occurs when the author of a book declares in its preface that despite believing that it is highly probable that everything the book maintains is true it is also highly probable that the book contains at least some errors. The preface paradox has often been presented as an example of a logically inconsistent belief that it is nevertheless rational to accept. The author offers the book on the assumption that everything it says is true, while acknowledging perhaps from past experience or the disappointment of others that there is a high probability that despite good intentions and conscientious efforts to avoid mistakes, it is only prudent to admit that the book probably includes some inaccuracies. Several kinds of lessons are drawn from the preface paradox in the philosophical literature, including the suggestion that rationality has nothing immediately to do with avoiding formal logical inconsistency in one's beliefs. A variety of methods have been proposed for avoiding the paradox, including distinctions in high-powered probability theories and rejection or refinement of the conjunction principle to prevent inconsistency in the apparently contradictory preface claims that the book is both free of and probably contains at least some mistakes in a nonmonotonic logic of belief. By contrast with these elaborate solutions, I propose a simple method of avoiding inconsistency in preface paradox assertions by indexing the two claims to distinct probability or justification sources, referencing in the first case the conscientious efforts to eliminate errors and in the second case the chagrin of past experience in discovering previously unsuspected mistakes or the occurrence of errors in the writings of others. Indexing is shown to be needed in any case to avoid similar inconsistencies in conflicting probability judgments in many applications. Incremental versions of the preface paradox as a variation of the lottery paradox can also be considered, for which probability or justification source indexing offers a similar solution. The consequences of the solution for preserving the concept of rationality as logical consistency of belief generally determine that the preface paradox does not establish the conclusion that it need be rational to accept logically inconsistent beliefs.

Noa Latham
Reed College, USA

The Causal Theory of Acting for a Reason

It is frequently said that an agent can have several reasons for j -ing yet j just for some of those reasons. Harry Frankfurt has made use of this view in arguing that if one j 's solely from reason R1 then one may be responsible for j -ing even though one could not have done otherwise because one also had an excusing but causally inoperative reason R2 for j -ing. Another frequent use is in arguing that the praiseworthiness of an action depends on which of one's reasons motivated the action. And it is frequently assumed that Davidson explicitly expresses this view in "Actions Reasons and Causes" in arguing for a causal theory of acting for a reason. I aim to challenge this view by arguing that there is no concept of causation that accommodates it. I address the arguments of Mele and Robb that the neural realisation of a reason could remain intact while its access to action is cut. And I conclude that a causal condition contributes very little to an account of acting for reasons.

Kirk Ludwig
University of Florida, USA

Rationality and non-inferential knowledge of what we think

This paper explores the relation between rationality and our non-inferential knowledge of what we think (first person knowledge), and, in particular, the question whether non-inferential knowledge of what we think can be seen as a condition on rational agency. I will argue that it is. Then given that rational agency is a condition on thought, non-inferential knowledge of what we think is a condition on thought as well. This leaves it open whether this provides us with a reductive explanation of first person knowledge. I argue that, while in a certain sense it can be seen as providing the source of first person knowledge, it does not provide a reductive explanation of it. I respond, tentatively, to the objection that any adequate account of the source of first person knowledge must provide a uniform explanation both of non-inferential knowledge of propositional attitudes and of sensations and other non-propositional conscious states, and that an account which finds the source of non-inferential knowledge in rationality cannot do this, by arguing it is a condition on the integration of non-propositional states with those states governed by rationality that they likewise be known non-inferentially.

Olga Markič
University of Ljubljana

Computationalism and rationality

Descartes and many philosophers afterwards think that rationality can not be explained within the physicalist framework. Hobbes idea that thinking is computing was not supported by the science of his time and it has to wait until the advent of modern digital computers. The proponents of the representational theory of mind take computer as a model to show how to connect semantic properties of a symbol with its causal properties via its syntax. They thus offer an explanation of how there could be nonarbitrary content relations among causally related thoughts, or, in Fodor's words: "How is rationality mechanically possible". I will argue that although the computational theory of mind provides in principle solution to the problem of mechanical rationality, it is questionable whether it is possible to achieve it in practice. I will discuss the frame problem and different proposals to answer the two main questions about the common-sense reasoning: (1) How to deal with the changing world? and (2) How to determine the relevant consequences of an event? I will suggest that connectionism may be the most promising approach.

Eugene Mills
Virginia Commonwealth University, USA

Audi on Rational, Unjustified Belief

Robert Audi claims that a person might be epistemically unjustified but nevertheless epistemically rational in believing something, and he explains this alleged possibility in terms of differing degrees of justification. I argue that the explanation is untenable, because there are no "degrees of justification" in any sense that would make the explanation intelligible, and that Audi fails to draw any clear distinction between epistemic rationality and epistemic justification as these apply to beliefs.

Nenad Miščević
University of Maribor, Slovenia

Conceptual Change: The Rationality of Intuition-Kinematics

The paper defends in a programmatic way an aposteriorist view of conceptual change focusing upon naive empirical concepts. In line with Putnam and Burge it stresses their m*etaphysical incorrectness*; they are more »conceptions« than full blown, metaphysically correct concepts. Naive kind-concepts typically serve as reference fixers. Intuitions based upon them have no modal reliability; in particular negative conceivability intuitions based upon naive concepts are a very poor guide to possibility (as against Chalmers and Jackson).The lack of reliability is to be explained in Kripkean style: naive intuitions result from *conflating* the actual intension of the predicate(-concept) with a confused epistemic intension often allowing for all sorts of ignorance-infected exotic possibilities (ensouled magnets, live water and the like).

The paper argues that metaphysically correct conceptual intuitions are often *a posteriori*. In the first step it stresses the importance of impact of empirical discovery upon epistemic intensions. Conceptual change, i.e. change in »conceptions«, often takes place under the impact of empirical discoveries, *at all stages* of concept-development (formation, grasping, intuition producing). Typically, there is a series of increasingly refined »epistemic intensions« associated with the series of concept(ion)s. Therefore, conceptual change is not determined in advance by conceptions as a kind of fixed rails of mind. A crucial role is played by epistemic goals and assumptions about the best methods of systematizing 'knowledge« (or firmly accepted beliefs). They provide the middle way between fixed conceptual rails (Jackson and Chalmers view) and anarchy (Yablo's proposal). Change in concept(ion)s is accompanied by change in corresponding intuitions. Given the role of empirical discovery in correction of concept(ion)s, there is an important *a posteriori* aspect to these semi-naive intuitions. Only metaphysically correct definitions of »X« and »P« yield full access to the truth condition of »X is P«. However, metaphysically correct definitions of X (and grasping *the* Concept of X) is often *a posteriori*. Coming close to metaphysically correct definition of X provides thinkers with the metaphysically correct (secondary, counterfactual) intension of »X«. The grasping of this intension and the necessities that go with it is therefore *a posteriori*. Therefore, metaphysically correct conceptual intuitions are often *a posteriori*.

Philip Percival
University of Glasgow

Epistemological Consequentialism

I try to do for epistemological consequentialism what several authors have attempted recently on behalf of virtue epistemology: expound the epistemological analogue of an ethical theory. My exposition is sympathetic, but not a defence: some of the doctrines to which I claim epistemological consequentialism is committed might turnout to be reductios. Just as ethical consequentialism grounds moral norms in the (ethical) value of consequences, epistemological consequentialism grounds epistemic norms in the (cognitive) value of consequences (I.i). Since consequences are uncertain, in each case the pursuit of value invokes decision-theory: so "decision-theoretic epistemology" can be a species of epistemological consequentialism (I.ii). Partly in the hope of giving a peripheral school of thought pursued mostly in the philosophy of science a more central place in mainstream epistemology (where it belongs, and where it has much to teach), I dwell on decision-theoretic analyses of two epistemic norms: one enjoins acceptances that are "rational" (II), the other the gathering of cost-free evidence (III). A tension with the "knowledge account" of assertion leads me to conclude that only a weakened version of the decision-theoretic analysis of rational acceptance survives. But I resist objections to decision-theoretic analyses of the injunction to gather cost-free evidence.

To defend decision-theoretic analyses of certain norms is not to defend the norms analysed. Like their ethical counterparts, epistemic norms pertaining to the direct pursuit of cognitive value are extremely demanding: they are "external," in that on any occasion an agent may have no way of knowing what they demand, and they clash with, and override, the more "internal" norms to which we are accustomed (IV.i). By contrast, epistemological consequentialism can only ground decision-theoretic epistemological norms - and evidential norms too - "indirectly": these epistemic norms stand to what the pursuit of cognitively valuable consequences directly demands as customary morality stands to what the pursuit of goodness directly demands (IV.ii). Herein lies a complacency at the core of reliabilism, the consequentialist structure of which is noted but not thought through. Though its advocates see it as an antidote to scepticism, and its detractors protest that it achieves anti-scepticism too easily, in one important respect reliabilism is a species of scepticism. Since "indirect" consequentialist norms are useful fictions, from a consequentialist - and hence reliabilist - viewpoint, Hume was right: there are no inductive reasons (IV.iii).

The conclusion that some customary epistemic norms are useful fictions serving to promote cognitive value might seem anti-pragmatist, since pragmatists are keen to ground epistemological and semantic concepts in non-cognitive values. But I detect a touch of pragmatism in indirect epistemological consequentialism: the cognitive value our inductive norms serve to promote has pragmatic impurities. "Pure" cognitive values pertain not to everday investigations, nor to scientific inquiry, but to "pure enquiry," a project from which all non-cognitive concerns are eliminated. The evidential norms which govern common-sense and/or science are inessential to this project (IV.iv).

Matjaž Potrč
University of Ljubljana

Particularism and Productivity Argument

The moral generalist presents the particularist as someone rejecting patterns, thereby embracing arbitrary classificatory decisions. The productivity argument is proposed then, according to which potential production of an infinite number of novel cases on the basis of a finite number of encountered cases is only possible with the assistance of a codifiable pattern assuring projectability. It is argued that the generalist presentation of the particularist undertaking is unjustifiably limited to codifiable tractable procedures leading to the formation of evaluative judgment. Particularist has no problem with the relevance if each occasion of a judgment formation is supported by non-tractable rich pattern requiring intuitive judgment. A list of such holistic particular judgments cannot be unified by an underlying tractable pattern, but each of the items on the list still presents an individual rich holistic pattern belonging to the same cognitive system.

Carolyn Price
Department of Philosophy, The Open University, UK

Rationality and Learning

In recent years, a number of philosophers and psychologists have argued that rationality should be understood as ecological rationality. There are a number of ways in which it would be possible to develop an ecological theory of theoretical rationality, but one way would be to tie rationality to a notion optimality, understood as ecological optimality. We might say that a subject will be reasoning in an ecologically optimal way if there is no identifiably better procedure that they could have used given that (1) the subject needs to form true beliefs quickly enough to be useful in guiding their behaviour (2) the subject has limited informational and cognitive resources and (3) the environment has certain stable and predictable properties.

In this paper I sketch two ways of developing this idea further. The first model - the static model - treats ecological optimality as the criterion of rationality. I suggest that this model faces two difficulties: first, a rational subject will be capable of learning to improve their reasoning, but the model fails to account for this; secondly, it is too strong, in that it treats all cases of poor reasoning as cases of irrationality. On the second model - the dynamic model - the capacity to learn has a more central role: a subject will be reasoning in a rational way only if he is using assumptions and procedures that would not normally (in Millikan's sense) be modified by mechanisms that function to improve his reasoning. The dynamic model explains the connection between rationality and the capacity to learn, and leaves room for a distinction between cases of irrationality and cases of (merely) flawed reasoning.

Bruce Russell
Wayne State University, USA

Morality, Reasons, and Rationality

When people ask "why should I be moral?" they might be asking whether it is always rational, or whether they always have reason, or whether there always is reason for them to be moral. I first analyze rationality and having reasons for action in terms of what a person is justified in believing about what reasons there are. With Scanlon I hold that reasons are things that count in favor of beliefs, intentions, or actions. With Parfit I reject the Self-interest theory and various desire-based theories of reasons for action as being too narrow and too broad, respectively. In the end, I argue via examples that there can be more reason for a person to do what is wrong than to do what is right. Insofar as we can be justified in believing this, it can be rational, and we can have most reason, to do what is wrong. However, because of natural partiality it is pragmatically best for us to think it is not possible for there to be more reason to do what is wrong. We are more likely to do what there in fact is most reason to do if we think that there is always most reason to do what we are obligated to do.

Marina Sbisà
University of Trieste, Italy

Argumentative rationality and text comprehension

There is a widespread conception of rationality according to which rational behavior is characterized by the use of effective means for achieving one's goals. This conception is unsatisfactory under various respects: it is far from clear that it can cope with the normative side of rationality or with the relationship between rationality and value and, however, it excludes goals from undergoing rational judgement.

In the philosophy of Paul Grice, instrumental rationality is taken into consideration when the rational justification of the Cooperative Principle is at issue. In the same vein, Grice also admits of a version of belief-desire psychology. But elsewhere he suggests a different conception of rationality, characterized by resort to argumentation. This conception is implicit in his description of how conversational implicatures are calculated and plays a central role in his theory of value.

The adoption of the instrumental conception of rationality leads to a naturalized, cognitive reading of both Cooperative Principle and implicature. Such is, for example, the path followed by Relevance Theory. I offer a reading of Cooperative Principle and implicature inspired by the argumentative conception of rationality. In this perspective, implicature is not so much a mental process by which we infer what the speaker has in mind, as a strategy we may use to justify meaning assignments.

I then draw some conclusions with respect to text comprehension. Philosophers, literary critics and semioticians have discussed at length whether any distinction can be drawn between correct and incorrect readings of a text. Grice suggests that the legitimacy of an implicature depends on the availability of an argumentative path leading to it. If text and circumstances make more than one argumentative path available, the receiver will be in a position to choose, or (in certain cases) will give the implicature the form of an open disjunction. In any case, those readings for which no argumentative support is available are excluded, so that there are correct and incorrect readings of a text after all. This does not

imply that people must eventually agree about where to draw the distinction. Any implication that argumentative rationality is a means for achieving consensus would paradoxically bring us back to instrumental rationality.

Dion Scott-Kakures
Scripps College, USA

Reasoning and Self-Knowledge in Self-Deception

In this essay, I defend the following two claims: (1) reflective, critical reasoning is essential to the process of self-deception; and (2), the process of self-deception involves a certain characteristic error of self-knowledge. By appeal to (1) and (2), I hope to show that we can adjudicate the current dispute about the nature of self-deception between those we might term "traditionalists," and those we might term "deflationists."

Nenad Smokrović
University of Rijeka; Croatia

Normativity of Reasoning and Naturalism

It is widely held that reasoning is normative in the sense that one involved in reasoning ought to reason or judge in such-and-such way. That means that there are norms of reasoning that prescribe how the inference ought to be made. Those philosophers who share this approach to reasoning also place normativity inside the analysis of reasoning holding that normativity is intrinsic to reasoning and that there are sui generis norms governing reasoning. Normativity is intrinsic to reasoning in the sense that grasping of meaning of the logical constant has guiding or directing properties for agent's behaviour.

Naturalists, trying to reconcile the traditional approach with a naturalist world-view, have to offer the strategies for naturalising the place and role of normativity in the analysis of reasoning. Among naturalising strategies I deem Horwich's pragmatic approach (in: Meaning, 1998) to be particularly significant. Horwich attempts to undermine the claim that normativity is intrinsic to reasoning. In the nutshell, he states that normativity is dependent on an agent's wants and beliefs. For example, my inference or transition from my belief set (say, p É q, p) to a new belief (say, q) must be conditioned by my desire or preference to produce a true belief. Formally: X ought to believe p, if p only if X (believing p) tends to satisfy her desire.
It is easy to see that this pragmatic schema perfectly suits goal-intended actions. As long as it is applied to belief formation, believing should be conceived as intentional action. My argument against Horwich's account of normativity is based on a simple but firm fact. Belief formation is not an intentional action as are linguistic or moral acts.

Matthias Steup
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Reliability Knowledge and the Reliability of Our Faculties

Can we know that our faculties are reliable? Some philosophers argue that using memory to find out whether memory is reliable, or sense perception to find out whether sense perception is reliable, is viciously circular. If that were true, knowing that our faculties are reliable would be difficult if not impossible. Other philosophers think that we can know that our faculties are reliable, but cannot without vicious circularity argue for their reliability. I defend the view that knowing that our faculties are reliable does involve circularity, but a kind of circularity that is innocuous. Furthermore, I try to show that arguments for the reliability of our faculties, although infected with circularity, can nevertheless be cogent: they can justify us in accepting their conclusions. I distinguish between source circularity, logical circularity, and epistemic circularity, and argue that only the latter deserves to be called "vicious". But epistemic, or vicious, circularity poses an obstacle to neither knowledge of the reliability of our faculties, nor arguments for their reliability.

Peter van Inwagen
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Is It Rational to Believe that the World Will End Soon? An Exercise in Bayesian Reasoning

Consider the hypothesis that the human species will come to an end in the next few centuries. One might make an estimation of the probability of this hypothesis that was based on our knowledge of factors that might cause human extinction (nuclear war, genetically engineered plagues, an asteroid striking the earth, and so on). The physicist Brandon Carter and the philosopher John Leslie have offered an argument for the conclusion that reflection on a certain non-causal factor, namely the point in human history at which we find ourselves, should lead us to revise upward, and significantly so, any estimation of the probability of the "immanent extinction" hypothesis that is based solely on causal factors. Their reasoning is essentially an application of Bayes's Theorem. In this paper, I examine Carter and Leslie's argument. I conclude that their reasoning is unpleasantly plausible, and that, nevertheless, it depends on a premise (a premise unrelated to the use they make of Bayes's Theorem) that deserves further examination.

Susan Vineberg
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Defending Probabilism as a Norm of Epistemic Rationality

Probabilism is generally taken as the view that a person's degrees of belief should satisfy the standard axioms of probability. It is a view that is often defended by providing a Dutch Book argument. This paper distinguishes several different versions of probabilism and also several versions of the Dutch Book argument. It then focuses on the recent attempts to depragmatize the Dutch Book argument offered by Howson and Urbach, and by Christensen. It is shown that these versions of the argument either fail to be genuine depragmatizations or else fail to establish a plausible version of probabilism.

Paul Weirich
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Rationality for Errant Agents

Decision theory's standard of utility maximization is for fully rational ideal agents. These agents enter decision problems having fully attained the goals of rationality for beliefs, desires, and past decisions. They have not made mistakes in the sense of having fallen short of the goals of rationality. Although they are fallible-that is, although it is possible for them to make mistakes-they have not made any mistakes. They enter decision problems error-free. Hence no mistakes shape the circumstances of their current decisions, in particular, the input for applications of utility analysis-options, probabilities, and utilities. Furthermore, the agents will not make mistakes in the future, and they know they are mistake-free, except perhaps in the current decision problem. Consequently, they need not worry about deciding in a way that compensates for mistakes elsewhere.

A way to make decision theory more realistic is to strip away the idealization that agents have not fallen short of the goals of rationality, that they have not made mistakes. Humans generally come to a decision problem burdened with mistakes. Even agents without cognitive limitations may bring mistakes to their decision problems because cognitive ability does not entail rationality. This paper considers how to apply utility analysis when an agent has made mistakes prior to his decision problem, or knows he will make mistakes afterwards. It treats both agents with and without cognitive limits. It relies on points about the scope of evaluations, the possibility of correcting mistakes, and the acceptability of some mistakes.

Student papers

Gorazd Andrejč
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Epistemology of Religious belief in the philosophy of William James

There is an old philosophical law, which says that we as intellectually responsible beings, should decide what to believe on the basis of evidence. In his paper "the Will to believe" William James' is concerned with cases, where the evidential pool is very large and the complexitiy of evidence of pros & cons makes it difficult to decide on purely intellectual basis, whether the evidence speaks in favor of one rather than the other position (typically, theism is such a position). I defend James' claim that there are subjective influences involved in our deciding what to believe and that in certain cases this is legitimate. What is more, in many cases our evaluation of the strength of the evidence seems to depend on our cognitive state, which is inextricably linked with subjective factors such as is our will, passions and alike. With James I conclude that one should take into account the subjective factors in explaining our epistemic behaviour.

Matija Arko
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Frege on Existence

Frege has developed semantics which allows the use of sentences which contain empty names. Such sentences are neither true nor false. Frege is of the opinion that affirmation of existence is just a special case of affirmation of number. Saying that something exist is tantamount to saying that something is not zero. Existence is in the same way as number, the

property of concepts. Ascribing existence to the individuals is senseless and violates the rules of logical syntax. In his early work Dialog mit Puenjerjem ueber Existenz Frege supports the view, that existence, as the first order property, is self-evident and cannot be denied. Existence is a property of everything. Therefore it is a self--evident property and a concept without a content and of unlimited extension. The claim that existence as predicate of first order is self-evident and therefore a concept without content and of unlimited extension, must be understood as a hypothetical reasoning, what would happen if existence was a first order concept. Because existence has no content and cannot be denied, Frege does not accept it as a first order concept.

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Power of principles?

Most people are generalist in their moral life. They appeal to principles in solving their moral problems. As generalists they claim that moral principles can be regarded as general rules that provide them with the morally right option in every situation. But there are many proofs that principles do not always fulfil the promise of telling us what is morally right in every case. The biggest problem for every generalist moral theory is a moral conflict which is an important part of moral thinking. A moral conflict occurs when more than one independent principle can be applied to the same case. It can be resolved only if one principle is fulfilled and the other principles give in. But which of the principle we will follow if all apply genuinely to the case. There are three strategies that an generalist can take to solve a moral conflict. The problem is that none of these strategies really solve the conflict. They rather try to avoid any conflict.

The situations in which principles fail in performing their task are used by particularists as an argument against generalism. Particularists deny the utility of appealing to principles or general rules when solving our moral tasks. For them morality is too complicated to be codified. Every situation that requires moral decision is for a particularist specific and therefore you cannot appeal to past moral decisions and situations in solving it. Their theory can be resumed in the belief of David Mcnaugton that we need a better moral vision more than better moral principles. This is also the thesis that I advocate.

Ana Butković
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Logic and Reasoning

The rationality debate is revolving around the following paradox. On the one hand human species is considered to be highly intelligent, but on the other hand, its performance in psychological experiments tasks shows a whole range of systematic errors and biases in reasoning. According to the traditional thesis, reasoning and rationality come in the same package. To be characterised as rational, one has to be able to reason according to logical rules. The present paper questions this position and briefly considers the alternatives, in particular the ones offered by Gilbert Harman and Jonathan St. B. T. Evans. It ultimately argues for the view that logic cannot tell us how we should reason. When talking about reasoning we are dealing with two sorts of things: first, logic, concerning valid deduction, and second, reasoning in the psychological sense. The denial of the antecedent would be an incorrect logical rule, but when the content of reasoning is taken into account it is no longer obvious that it leads to mistakes. For explanation of human reasoning pragmatical notions are more appropriate than logical ones. Also, an occasional partial correspondence between logic and a piece of reasoning cannot be extended to the full range of our inferential practice, which is content- and context-dependent, as the standard should also be. Further, maxims of reflection and principles of revision of the kind Harman proposed in his "Change of view" could play the role of much needed extra-logical rules. Presumably, it is these rules, not logical ones that show the best way to achieve rationality in the sense of intelligent behaviour.

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Evolutionary rationality: Papineau's proposal

In the rationality debate two problems pop up: the evaluative problem which questions the status of our standard of rationality and the explanatory problem which is to explain how come that we are so successful in theoretical rationality given our poor performances on psychological tests. The paper focuses on the explanatory problem and discusses the answer to it suggested by David Papineau in his "The Evolution of Knowledge". Papineau's naturalistic theory endorses the notion of fast and frugal belief-forming methods, which cause the poor performances. However, humans can figure out which better, i.e. more truth conducive methods of belief formation will provide them with true answers. To do so, humans have to be able to identify the end of truth. Papineau claims that they do this through their ability of understanding other people's minds. When they have acquired the end of truth, through the ability of means end reasoning they will need to figure out which means are the best to achieve their truth goal.

The following three criticisms are argued in the present paper. First, there is no clear explanation of how our ability of means end reasoning evolved. Papineau rejects the possibilities that means-end reasoning evolved as a separate faculty of our brain or as a spandrel of other abilities. He proposes two middle way candidates: first: the ability of understanding of mind and, second: language. But, after discarding the understanding of mind as an unappropriate candidate, Papineau takes no definite stance as to which candidate answer might be correct. The second criticism argues that his tentative linguistic proposal sits ill with

the empirical data on domain specific means-end reasoning. Therefore the question of how means-end reasoning evolved remains unanswered. The third criticism points out that Papineau owes us a further explanation of how we are able to bypass the quick and dirty modes of thought. To say that we are able to adopt reliable methods of belief formation if we have time and if the stakes are high doesn't seem enough to give a proper solution to this problem. Being a naturalist, Papineau has also to address this general empirical issue.

Ana Gavran
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Crane on Narrow Content

The subject of the paper is the debate between externalism and internalism about mental content, presented by Tim Crane in his book "Elements of Mind", ch. 4. Crane's sympathies in this debate are with internalism. The paper attempts to show that Crane's argumentation is not refuting Twin Earth argument and externalism and in its basis does not differ much from externalism itself. Crane's version of the argument for externalism features two key premises: (1)The content of a thought determines what the thought is about/what it refers to (Content Determines Reference Principle) and (2)The Twins are reffering to different things when they use the word "water". From these, in a few simple steps Crane's externalist derives (6)Therefore their thoughts are not "in their heads". Crane suggests denying Content Determines Reference Principle. For Crane the case of indexical thoughts (thought expressed by indexical expresions, such as "I", "here", "now") is one in which the Principle loses it's general validity. He defines content as the way something is being thought about. The Principle here begins to lose it's general validity, because it is implausible to say that all "here" - thinkers or "now" - thinkers do not have "any aspect of their thought in common". Here externalist is free to say that there is an aspect of the content that is common to various "here" - thinkers or to Earthlings and their Twins, i.e. the (here or water) stereotype. So externalist might as well accept that Twins share an aspect of the content, an internal component, or a stereotype. Moreover context is in a fact enviroment, i.e. external objects, and content is again relative to a context (external objects). Although Crane wants to make reference less important then content, in his argumentation reference is relative to a context (external circumstances) and difference in reference makes for a difference in the content. To recap, in the first stage Crane reduces "content" to "some aspect of the content" although he needs all aspects of the content to get identity of the thoughts but his view then come close to something acceptable for externalists. In the second stage he makes content relative to a context but then reference still determines content.

Smiljana Gartner
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Schiffer's Unhappy Face Solution of the Skeptical Paradox

The Classical Argument from Skepticism (cAS) is: 1. I don't know that I am not a brain in a vat (not-H); 2. If I don't know that I am not-H, then I don't know that I have hands (O); (Therefore) 3. I don't know that O. cAS is making a big fuss not only in philosophy but also in science. If the argument is sound then we cannot claim that we know something and this also effects our ordinary claims about life, nature and us. cAS was a great trial to philosophers

because some of them think that every premise is highly plausible; but to reject skepticism one must show that one of these premises is false.

In the first part I introduce Schiffer's solution of the skeptical paradox, "the unhappy face solution". According to Schiffer the reason for the paradox is incoherence in our concept of knowledge. Is it so hard to admit that the skeptic is right or at least that she is right according to a posteriori claims? In the second part I argue that his solution rests on a false assumption. It is not plausible to take the first premise, "I know that I have hands", (as Schiffer does because he reverses the cAS) for granted and then move on to the explanation why we are trapped in the paradox. With the help of indirect realism and Robinson's argument from hallucination I show that we cannot be sure about the existence of external physical objects. Thus, because we also cannot find neither deductive nor inductive inference from internal to external (as Berkeley said) the claim "I know that I have hands" is false.

Of course, we can catch the tail again and say that there are still contextualist possibilities with respect to different standards of knowing, or to use Schiffer's claim, that there is always a probability that some deceiver exists but to get to the evidence that exists "it goes beyond what one normally has when one takes oneself to have a perceptual knowledge". (Schiffer, 1996: 33) But, as Unger argues, and I agree with him, we cannot have different epistemic standards neither can we be more or less certain. To be certain, i.e. to be absolutely certain, i.e. to know would mean that an agent is excluding any possibility that some new data can change her claim. But this is ignorant and dogmatic as history of sciences can prove. With the help of Unger I show that neither the contextualist's nor Shiffer's approach is plausible. We can also conclude that the first premise in the Schiffer's argument, that is, I know that I have hands, is false. We simply cannot be justified in claiming I know that I have hands. If this is so, then his whole argument is not plausible and "The unhappy face solution" is fruitless.

Maja Malec
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David Lewis and Modal Realism

When Lewis first presented his modal realism – the ontological theory that other possible worlds exist in the same way as our world, his thesis was met with incredulous stares. Perhaps it is even more strange that such an extreme theory was proposed by David Lewis. How can an empiricist in the tradition of Hume, a commonsensical fellow, as he once called himself, endorse the existence of concrete possible worlds? How can modal realism coexist with physicalism or, more accurately, Lewis's doctrine of Humean Supervenience, which says that all features of the world supervene on spatio-temporal arrangement of local qualities? I will try to show that Lewis developed his modal realism not in spite of, but because of Humean Supervenience.

Lewis's main objective is to explain everything there is and to simplify the total theory of the world. He aims to show that everything supervenes on the arrangement of qualities. He denies necessary connections between distinct existents. But he also believes that modal opinions are part of our total theory. Modalities can not be simply reduced to factuality. The problem of modality is successfully solved within a possible worlds theory. But what kind of entities are possible worlds? Since Lewis wants to have a reductive analysis of modality in non-modal terms, he can not use ersatz possible worlds. His solution is to postulate possible worlds that

are as real as our own world. Lewis can not say that modality supervenes on the arrangements of facts of this world, so he tries to show that modalities supervene on the arrangements of worlds. Therefore he must deny a commonsensical opinion that everything is actual. But this is, in his opinion, a small price to pay given Humean Supervenience and his request for simple and economical philosophical theory.

Teja Oblak
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Berkeley: Immaterialism does not imply non-matter

Arguing for immaterialism does not imply the inexistence of matter. This thesis is grounded on Berkeley's distinction between ideas as objects and abstract ideas (as interpreted by Kenneth P. Winkler), which the author connects with Lloyd's differentiation between linguistic and physical reality. On the basis of this differentiation the author claims that mind and matter can be differentiated only in terms of two different language-games. Consequently, the distinction between matter and mind should be understood as referring to a specific language-game Ln, which is (according to Lloyd) strictly philosophical. It follows that: (i) Berkeley's metaphysics does not deal with physical world; (ii) The distinction between ideas as objects and real objects (and with it the distinction between matter and mind) is only linguistic. Thus, a reality above all language-games must be presupposed, a reality that corresponds to Berkeley's God and His place in Berkeley's metaphysics.

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Problems in the Hot Theory of Consciousness

The paper discusses Rosenthal's HOT theory of consciousness. It raises three potential difficulties for it. The first one concerns memory. Past mental states present a problem for HOT theory. Given that, according to it we are conscious of mental states when we think about them as they are present in our minds. The HOT theorist then has two options. The first option is: One is conscious of a mental state when one thinks about it as it is present in mind; past mental state is not present in mind, therefore, one can not be conscious of past mental states. The second option is: One is conscious of a mental state when one thinks about it as it is present in mind; one can think about a past mental state only as it is a present thing in mind, therefore, consciousness of past mental state is a case of misrepresentation. Both options are unacceptable. The second worry concerns misrepresentation. Rosenthal allows for HOTs that misrepresents their object, e.g. fear can be wrongly represented as pain. But the question is what «gives» the content to HOT. If Rosenthal accepts the causal theory of reference the pain itself has to cause the thought about pain But he assumes that fear causes a thought about pain because the first to second order connection is somehow distracted. But even so, it is not clear how this distraction can »give» content of HOT. The third worry concerns part-whole relation. Take for example seeing a green round table. It is possible to explain relations between first order mental states and HOTs in three ways. First: Seeing a table is in fact one mental state which is accompanied with a bunch of HOTs. Each HOT is about seeing some property (of the table). Second way: seeing a table is a single mental state accompanied with a single HOT the content of which is «I see a round , green table». Third way : seeing a table

is a compound of many first order mental states, each accompanied by a HOT of its own. According to first and third option we should be conscious of greenness independently of consciousness of   roundness. This options leave a problem: how are we conscious of greenness and roundness as properties of table? HOT theorists owe us a more detailed account of the three issues listed.

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In Defence of Moral Particularism: Is it Rational to Trust Patty?

There is a garden variety of views in various fields of philosophy that could be labelled or label themselves as "particularism". Even when one focuses on moral particularism, one can find several different and in some cases also mutually incompatible positions. These variations of moral particularism diverge from naturalistic to non-naturalistic, from ones allowing for ceteris paribus or soft laws to entirely non-patternable ones, from those oriented more on our moral reasoning in a actual every-day situations to those oriented directly at moral criteria. Objections and challenges can be raised against such positions about our moral functioning and the nature of moral criteria, but I tend to say that many if not all can be successfully meet.

I particularly focus on two presumably defeating arguments by Brad Hooker posited against moral particularism. The first is the argument against the holism of reasons. I will show that the entire argument and its force are build partially upon misunderstanding or misinterpretation of Jonathan Dancy's original argument for holism of reasons and to some extent also upon our diverging intuitions about the functioning of reasons. The second argument is of more practical nature. Hooker tries to show that it would be very bad and disadvantageous for a certain society to accept moral particularism, since he thinks that collective public commitment to Rossian generalism would lead to considerably more trust among strangers than would collective public commitment to particularism. As it will turn out such an argument is false, badly chosen and unpersuasive. One can still trust Patty.

Rationality

▪ GENERAL INFORMATION

Philosophical conferences at Bled (Slovenia) were initiated, on the suggestion by John Biro, in 1993 at first as a continuation of the IUC - Dubrovnik postgraduate course in philosophy but they gradually started a life of their own. The first week of June at Bled is traditionally reserved for a conference dedicated to various topics in the field of analytical philosophy. **Rationality** is the **tenth** Bled Philosophical Conference. All events take place in Hotel *Kompas*, Cankarjeva 2, Bled.

▪ ORGANISATION

The conference is organized by a team consisting of *Eugene Mills* of Virginia Commonwealth University, *Mylan Engel* of the Northern Illinois University, *Matjaž Potrč* of the University of Ljubljana, *Nenad Miščević* of the University of Maribor, and *Danilo Šuster* of the University of Maribor. The conference is included in the program of the activities of the *Slovenian Society for Analytic Philosophy*.

▪ FINANCIAL SUPPORT

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